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Taxes on Individual Incomes
DIRECT TAXATION of individual incomes is a powerful fiscal
device for transferring to the Treasury a portion of civilian
money incomes, and thus restricting civilian spending and
combatting inflation. The individual income tax, like other
taxes, has the advantage over borrowing that it leaves no her-
itage of public debt. It also has the advantage over certain
other fiscal devices that it can be designed with approximate
precision to distribute sacrifices among citizens according to
some predetermined public policy. For• example, itis re-
garded as having an advantage over corporation taxes in that
the corresponding burdens on Citizens can be allocated more
precisely according to prevailing notions of equity. A tax on
income which lays the same total burden on the taxpayer
as excises leaves him a greater freedom of choice in his pur-
chases; but, against this advantage, one must recognize that
a specific purpose of excises may be to discourage certain
purchases. Moreover, unlike excises and other indirect taxes
which are sometimes 'hidden', the direct tax on income
makes the taxpayer painfully aware of his sacrifice; and the
psychological implications of such awareness are often cited
to its advantage.
Government borrowing of the non-inflationary type draws
mainly from income which is currently saved by individuals
or corporations, whether such saving is purely voluntary, is
necessitated by the unavailability of goods for purchase, or
is compelled by some direct means. Corporate taxes absorb
money incomes which might remain in the hands of corpora-
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tions and be either spent or saved by them, and restrict the
dividends disbursed to individuals, thereby denying them
freedom either to spend or to save that amount of income.
Excises absorb money incomes, in some cases of individuals
and in others of enterprises, as an incident to expenditure on
the specific commodities or services taxed. The individual
income tax absorbs oniy money income which has already
come into the possession of individuals, and does so regard-
less whether they spend all or save a portion.
1 RATES AND OTHER PROVISIONS UNDER THE 1941 ACT
The individual income tax under the Revenue Act of 1941
includes a normal tax of 4 per cent and surtaxes ranging
from 6 per cent on the lowest bracket (up to $2,000) to 77
per cent on the highest (over $5,000,000). The bases to which
these two parts of the income tax are applied differ some-
what, and are called normal tax net income and surtax net
income, respectively. Normal tax net income excludes inter-
est on certain partly exempt federal securities; also an amount
designated the earned income credit, the effect of the latter
being an indirect reduction of io per cent in the normal tax
rcate on what is legally defined as 'earned income'. Neither
item is excluded from surtax net income. Apart from these
differences, the bases of both taxes are the residue after the
personal exemption and credit for dependents have been sub-
tracted from a net taxable income arrived at by making cer-
tain legally defined deductions (for interest paid, taxes paid,
charitable contributions, etc.) from the basic figure covering
all receipts of taxable income.' The personal exemption is
$1,500 for a married couple or the head of a family, and $750
for a single person; a credit of $400 is allowed for each de-
pendent.2
The left section of Table 22 shows the surtax rates for se-
lected brackets, intermediate between the minimum rate of
6 per cent and the maximum of 77. Differences between
bracket rates are much greater for incomes in the lower partTAXES ON INDIVIDUAL INCOMES 247
of the scale than in the upper, but this difference is less pro-
nounced for the average surtax rates in the right section.
And, since this table gives surtax rates only, the normal tax
of 4 per cent must be added to obtain the full effect of the
income tax upon each bracket.3 The range of graduation for
the entire income tax extends from io per cent for the low-
est bracket of surtax net income to 8i per cent fOr the highest.
From the bracket rates the severity of the tax at various
levels of income cannot be thoroughly understood, although
the top bracket rate applicable to the income of an individual
may well have an important bearing upon his incentives as
an investor or producer. Leaving aside the normal tax and
considering the surtax alone, we find in average rates, such
as those in the right section of Table 22, a direct measure of
severity. The figures of Table 22 are for selected income
levels; the full record for all levels is shown in the i 941 curve
TABLE 22
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at low levels, are almost inevitable in any attempt to enlarge
greatly the surtax revenue. The Acts of 1940 and 1941,
at enlarging that revenue, had to be designed with the fore-
knowledge' that not much additional revenue could be ob-
tained from the top brackets; because they were already taxed
so severely that doubt existed in some quarters whether
higher top bracket rates would yield any new revenue and
because they might encourage further splitting of inco:me by
taxpayers among members of their families. Some further
realization of revenue from somewhat higher top bracket
rates may for various reasons be possible now than was re-
garded possible in 1940 or 1941; but even now the highest
incomes, under any feasible advances in rates, can produce
only a minor fraction of the new revenue needed from the
income tax.5
In exploring the possibility of utilizing the individual in-
come tax to absorb excess money incomes, changes in rates
for bOth the normal tax and the surtax must be considered.
And this exploration, if thorough, must go beyond changes
in rates, i.e., to tile base to which these rates apply—the defi-
nition of taxable income, and the various allowances and
credits—and to methods of collecting the tax (see Ch. 1 i).
Finally, for practical reasons, how to prevent avoidance of
taxes under the present rates or any others that might be
adopted must be considered.
2 CHANGES IN INCOME TAX RATES
The most obvious means of increasing the total tax on indi-
vidual incomes, within the framework of the present law, is
to raise rates. No reason appears for raising the normal rate;
in fact, good reasons stand against it, especially as the present
law already includes a substantial surtax upon every income
which is subject to the normal tax. An advance would, under
the present law, be inapplicable to interest received on partly
tax-exempt federal obligations; whereas an equal advance in
the lowest bracket rate of surtax would apply to such interest.250 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
Likewise, an advance in the normal rate would be subject to
an offset on account of the earned income credit, whereas an
equal advance in the surtax rate would not. On these grounds,
an advance in the normal rate would be less satisfactory than
an equivalent advance in the lowest bracket of surtax rates.
On the assumption that surtax rate advances are to be set
with a view to absorbing a predetermined total of money
income, as nearly as the great difficulties of estimating will
allow, how are the burdens to be distributed along the in-
come scale? The cynic may suggest that political considera-
tions will rule: that politicians, recognizing that voters are
vastly more numerous in the lower than in the intermediate
and higher brackets, will place none or as little as possible of
the burden upon the lower brackets. This does not mean that
a purely political handling of the distribution would neces-
sarily place no burden below some moderate level of income
and all above, or that such a boundary, between incomes es-
caping and those subjected to burden, would necessarily be
as high as it could be placed if nearly all of each income'
above that level were taken by nearly confiscatory taxes.6
Politicians may believe that some increase in the burden
upon the low brackets would alienate fewer votes than would
be lost through the alternatively necessary increase in the
severity of new burdens upon individuals in somewhat higher
brackets. The curve of average rates traced by a purely politi-
cal handling of the question, in other words, might not in-
clude an abrupt jump from the low rate applied on low
bracket incomes to a plateau of high rates applied upon all
larger incomes. It might instead show an elongated-S shape
similar to that of the curves in Chart 8.
Political considerations will undoubtedly play some part
in determining the rate curve actually established by law;
but other considerations will also play an important, perhaps
decisive, part; and the latter are the considerations deserving
more detailed examination here. They cover chiefly the war-
time incentives of taxpayers in various income groups; theTAXES ON INDIVIDUAL INCOMES 251
degree to which taxpayers in various groups have fixed in-
comes, or enjoy instead incomes enlarged during the war; the
degree to which incomes are drawn down, by state income
taxes and similar fixed charges; the degree to which incomes
are drawn down by excises or other indirect taxes or by social
security taxes; and the amount of more or less automatic sav-
ings from consumption expenditures because less can be spent
on consumer goods. Some of these considerations are. related
to others; and, in any case, they must be studied in combina-
tion in comparing feasible increases in the tax burden at
various income levels.
A weighty consideration bearing upon tax policy concerns
the protection of the wartime incentives of citizens, in order
to call forth their maximum effort. Any new tax burden so
severe as to compel very large sacrifices by the taxpayers of a
particular class, especially if their sacrifices seem to them out
of proportion to those of other classes, may seriously weaken
incentives and obstruct the war effort. The way in which in-
centives bear upon the war program and the degree to which
damage to the incentives of particular classes of individuals
can impede it cannot be known or predicted with any ap-
proach to precision; yet a rough qualitative appraisal of the
differences among classes is possible, and helpful for present
purposes. The most obvious broad classes of individuals to
be considered are wage workers, hired managers and execu-
tives, farmers, other owners of unincorporated businesses,
specialists, investors. Many individuals fall into
more than one of these categories; but nearly every indi-
vidual belongs mainly to some one category, and has interests
which affect his incentives, and economic functions which
affect his capacity to promote or impede the war effort, mainly
characteristic of that category.
Many factors besides taxes affect the incentives of various
individuals, and they vary among the above categories and to
some extent within any one category. For example, most wage
workers have obtained or are obtaining steadier employment252 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
or higher wages or both as a result of the war, and this posi-
tive incentive factor may offset in whole or in part the nega-
tive factor of a fairly heavy tax. Likewise, numerous managers
and executives are receiving larger money rewards and deriv-
ing such intangible satisfaction and benefit as comes from the
reputation of successful management; and these favorable
incentive factors may not be offset by even substantial in-
creases in the tax burden. On the other hand, great numbers
of professional specialists and perhaps the majority of in-
vestors receive little or no benefit from the war program, and
of course have in any case little direct part in the great task
of war output. Their incentives may therefore seem of little
moment. Moreover, for the population in general, numerous
noneconomic factors—confidence inleadership,pride in
achievement, and other psychological elements—affect incen-
tives, and affect them in varying degrees for different cate-
gories or groups of people. Taxation is thus merely one of
several factors influencing war incentives.
One may contend in particular that the incentives of in-
vestors have little bearing upon the volume and speed of
war-goods production, except to the degree that the new plant
and equipment of war industries is financed by private in-
vestors and not by government, and except as their vigorous
response is needed to offerings of government bonds. In truth,
with respect to several categories and subgroups within a cate-
gory, opinions differ concerning how essential protection of
incentives is to the war effort. We may be certain that the
incentives of the moderate number of managers and execu-
tives in enterprises making war goods are vastly more impor-
tant than those of similar individuals in less vital enterprises,
but whether the former are more important than the incen-
tives of the large number of wage workers in war industries
is more open to doubt. This doubt, in practical terms, takes
rather the following form: granting that taxes must be so
heavy as perhaps to do some harm to incentives all along the
line, doubt may exist that the possible harm to incentives ofTAXES ON INDIVIDUAL INCOMES ,253
the executive-manager class will, for a proposed distribution
of new tax burdens, be more or less serious for the war pro-
gram than the possible harm to incentives of wage workers.
Similar doubts may arise in comparing the effects of tax
burdens on pther categories of individuals, in terms of pos-
sible damage to incentives and to the war effort; and yet those
responsible for tax policy must, as best they can, resolve these
doubts in order to design a program such that taxes shall
exert a minimum depressive effect upon output. Moreover,
responsible authorities will recognize that the effect of a tax
on incentives may need to be appraised in terms of the tax on
a marginal addition to income, rather than of the entire tax
on the entire income; and they will recognize also that in
some cases an additional tax may prove to be a posit:ive in-
centive: one may work harder to maintain his former income
after taxes.
While the several categories mentioned above are not con-
fined within specific income brackets, some rough correlation
exists: most wage workers and farmers are in the low and
lower intermediate brackets, most owners (other than farmers)
of unincorporated businesses are in the lower intermediate,
most professional specialists are in the intermediate, execu-
tives and managers fall mainly in the intermediate and lower
high brackets with a moderate fraction scattered in still higher
brackets, most investors are in the intermediate and high
brackets.7 Thus, granting that a workable• opinion can be
reached concerning which categories need greater protection
of their incentives in the interest of the war, we have a rough
guide to the distribution of tax burdens along the income
scale. In this connection, the relative severity of new burdens
merits consideration: the incentives of the mass may be dam-
aged if they feel that more fortunate citizens get off too
lightly.
Incentives have been discussed at some length, partly be-
cause of their great capacity to affect war output and partly
to point out the great difficulty of making precise allowances254 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
in a tax program to the end of protecting vital incentives.
The other major considerations listed above are now dis-
cussed more briefly. Taxes, other than the federal surtax,
constitute drains upon income all along the size scale of in-
come. Social security taxes affect the low and lower inter-
mediate brackets, and any drastic increase in them (the part
assessed against the worker, see Ch. 12) will restrict the feasi-
bility of extremely heavy increases in the surtax on the lowest
brackets. Selective excises and sales taxes (see Ch. g) drain
income from all consumers; but, with some reservations for
the more narrowly selective excises, the drain is much greater
as a percentage of income at low and intermediate than at
high levels. Any drastic increase will limit possible increases
in the surtax on the low brackets, and in less degree on the
intermediate. State income taxes affect mainly the interme-
diate and high brackets; and there they constitute a definite
bar to the approach of the total federal income tax to a ioo
per cent levy on income. Even with a federal tax substan-
tially below ioo per cent, the combined federal and state
taxes might be confiscatory.8 The very slowness with which
top bracket surtaxes have in recent tax revisions been ad-
vanced reflects this limitation; another factor has been the
belief that rates could not be advanced much further without
causing such evasion or avoidance, perhaps through pur-
chase of tax-exempt securities, as would cancel any intended
increase in total revenue.
Despite the vigor and extent of the war boom, it has
brought to a very large number of taxpayers, chiefly in the
intermediate and lower high brackets, no increases in earn-
ings; and they remain dependent on fixed incomes. Many of
these individuals have also large elements of fixed or nearly
fixed costs—taxes on their homes and perhaps interest on resi-
dential mortgages, state income taxes, insurance premiums,
and (though these are less clearly 'fixed') costs of carrying to
completion the education of their children. In view of the
advances in living costs that have already taken place, a veryTAXES ON INDIVIDUAL INCOMES 255
severe advance in the federal income tax might render these
individuals unable to meet some of their fixed charges. Such
an outcome would mean a sacrifice in standard of living for
these middle group people, a standard which has, to be sure,
been above any attainable by people in the low brackets. The
notion prevails in some quarters that all or as nearly as pos-
sible all the sacrifices of war should be laid upon those mem-
bers of the community heretofore regarded as more fortunate,
but the fact should not be overlooked that most people can
probably bear more easily a restriction on increases in their
spending than absolute curtailment.
An important incidental consequence of the war effort is
the development of automatic savings as a result of the un-
availability of certain consumer goods (see Ch. 3 and 6). The
amount of these automatic savings is heightened by the en-
largement of the incomes of many taxpayers due to the war
boom. Chapter 3 has shown that those two factors combined,
larger incomes and shortages of goods, will result in an enor-
mous excess income in the middle range of incomes, and a
somewhat less enormous excess in the high range. This excess
income and its distribution along the income scale are im-
portant guides in setting surtax rates.
The foregoing considerations, which can be weighed only
in broad and mainly qualitative terms, are among the chief
factors, entirely apart from purely political considerations,
bearing upon the distribution of new tax burdens, through
advances in surtax rates, along the income scale. Just how the
various considerations will be balanced and combined in
arriving at a practical selection of rates cannot be foreseen;
and, in weighing any such considerations, notice must always
be taken of the probability that they apply in different de-
gree to different taxpayers in the same income bracket. In
all matters of taxation, practical decisions must be made in
terms of averages pertaining to groups of taxpayers, and the
actual schedule may fit more closely the circumstances of
some members than of others. Extreme hardship on mdi-256 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
viduals can usually be ameliorated by special provisions, but
no law can be so intricate as to allow adequately for all the
ordinary differences in circumstances among taxpayers. Dif-
ferences in income constitute merely one measure, though
perhaps the most significant, of differences in circumstances
which make tax burdens more easily borne by some than by
others.
Various Scales of Progression
Average surtax rates on Chart 8 for 1941, ranging from 6
per cent on the lowest taxable incomes to 74.5 per cent at $5
million, and a still higher figure, though under 77 per cent,
for incomes above that level, give some notion of the maxi-
mum possible advances at various income levels, particularly
if the above figures are increased by about 4 to cover the nor-
mal tax also. Any advance in the average surtax rate plus the
normal rate by as much as 19 per cent for incomes above
millionwould confiscate all income above the minimum in-
tended to be tax free through the personal exemption and
credit for dependents. Moreover, the imposition of the fed-
eral surtax plus normal rates even approaching ioo per cent
on an average basis would greatly strengthen the incentive to
evade or avoid taxes, already so serious a tendency under
present rates as to call in doubt the possibility of getting any
bigger tax yield by an advance in the rates on very high in-
comes. As some of the latter objections may be reduced by
patriotism and other factors peculiar to the war, some ad-
vance in the average rate on very high incomes is probably
feasible. Careful consideration by governmental and other
specialists of all the factors involved may indicate the maxi-
mum feasible advance; but limitations of the sort mentioned
above mean that the maximum advance will fall far short of
19 per cent (the difference between the present highest aver-
age rate of 8i and ioo) and may well be not over 6 to 8 per
cent, from 77toor 85, in the surtax rate for the top
bracket. Even confiscation of large incomes would not, how-TAXES ON INDIVIDUAL INCOMES 257
ever, remove the need, for heavy increases in taxes upon
smaller incomes, if inflation, with all its destructive conse-
quences for the low income groups as well as for others, and
other evils are to be averted. If the entire amount of incomes
above $ioo,ooo were taxed away, the total so raised would be
somewhat less than $i billion and would be a small fraction
of the inflationary excess which should be transferred to the
Treasury. Moreover, as existing taxes take a large fraction of
such incomes, the additional levy would yield much less than
$i billion.
At the other end of the income scale, where the average
rate is now io per cent, and in the intervening ranges, much
more room for rate advances exists. Moreover, at the low
end of the scale, a larger proportion of the income received
is spent on consumption than at the high end. Consequently,
an income tax program designed chiefly to combat inflation,
in a situation where saved income may largely be absorbed by
government borrowing, may be expected to apply greater rate
advances on low and intermediate than on large incomes.
Opinions can differ widely about what rates should be set
for the low and intermediate brackets. We do not suggest
the appropriate rate schedule, but show instead in Chart 9
selected tentative curves representing average surtax rates.
For comparison, the curve corresponding to the Act of 1941
isshown. The curves have been so drawn that they rise
smoothly and regularly. Any bulges, such as the upward
bulge for large incomes and the downward bulge for small
incomes in the curve for the 1941 Act, necessarily make for
greater steepness in some parts of the curve than in others,
implying a more severe application of progression in one part
of the income scale than in others. Such bulges may be justi-
fied in wartime by the considerations outlined above, but the
desirability of treating every particular taxpayer as nearly as
possible like those who have somewhat smaller or larger in-
comes remains very strong.
All the tentative curves have been drawn with an indicated258 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
advance in the average surtax rate of 6 per cent for a surtax
net income of $5 million, which may be about the maximum
feasible increase at that level. The curves show selected dis-
tributions of the new burden among incomes of different
CHART9
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sizes. We emphasize again that these curves are tentative pic-
tures of possibilities, regarded as feasible if other parts of
the total tax structure are adapted to these arrangements for
the income tax, and are not suggestions as to what is wise
policy. Curves A and B are essentially of the same shape; but
the rate advance for A is much higher than for B at the low-
est level, and this difference tapers off as the income increases.
Revenue under schedule A would be much greater than
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under B. If A may be regarded as the most severe schedule of
rates feasible at present, with the existing or even moderate
advances in excises, then much heavier excises or a heavy
general sales tax might suggest some such generally lower
schedule of average surtax rates as is implied by B. Though
the precise amount of the shift from A to B might not be
that shown in the chart, the direction would be that indicated.
Curves A and C are not essentially of the same shape.
Curve A has somewhat less prominent bulges—the downward
bulge between about $5,000 and $20,000, and the upward
bulge between about $50,000 and $500,000—than the 1941
curve; which is another way of saying that the steepest part
of Curve A is somewhat less steep than that of the 1941curve.
On the other hand, the bulges of Curve C are much more
pronounced than those for 1941, and the steepest part of
Curve C is much steeper than that for 1941.Arate schedule
like that of Curve C, while it might be designed to yield the
same total revenue as that of Curve A, would imply a heavier
burden on the high brackets and lighter burdens on the low
and intermediate, than the Curve A schedule. Also, in the
middle of the high bracket, from about $20,000 to about
$100,000, the progression is more rapid for C than for A:
two taxpayers at somewhat different points in that range have
a much greater difference in tax burden under C than under
A. Curve C also carries the extremely high (perhaps nearly
confiscatory) rates to a lower level of high incomes than A.
No careful attempt has been made to draw Curves A and
C so that each would yield the same total revenue; but they
do take account of the fact that a given change (of, say, 5
points) in the rate brings much more revenue from small
than from large incomes, because of the much .greater aggre-
gate income at low than at high levels (see Chart io, which
shows, for 1939,thedistribution of income at various levels).
For this reason the shift downward from Curve A to C for
small and moderately larger incomes is much less than the
shift upward near $ioo,ooo. We repeat that these differences,260 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
between the shifts at low and at high levels, have not been
determined precisely so that A and C would yield the same
total revenue. But their direction is correctly indicated: the
downward shift for low levels would have to be less than the
CHART 10
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the curve as are implied in passing from A to C, and how far
such shifting will be attempted will depend partly on politi-
cal considerations and partly upon considerations of the sort
outlined above. Thus, numerous curves besides C could be
drawn, all aimed at yielding the same total revenue as A and
all differing from A in the amount by which they shift the
burdens implied by A at various income levels to different
levels. The extreme case was mentioned in another connec-
tion and would be reflected by a curve nearly horizontal at
the bottom brackets, rising almost vertically at some higher
level (but still a small income, if the same total revenue as
under A were to be obtained), and then nearly horizontal and
very high for all incomes above that level. Such an extreme
arrangement could not fail to arouse hostility among great
numbers of taxpayers, those whose incomes reached consider-
ably above the critical level at which the rate advanced so
sharply as well as those whose incomes just passed that level,
for they would be aware that many individuals receiving only
moderately smaller incomes were escaping with strikingly
lighter tax burdens. No such extreme application of the dis-
tortion of Curve A, with a view to shifting burdens upward
along the income scale, is likely to receive serious attention.
But any curve which has a very steep portion, such as even
Curve C, would arouse hostility of the same sort though in
less degree: individuals whose incomes are in the range
marked by the steepest part of the curve are aware that their
tax burdens are much heavier than those of people having
only moderately smaller incomes.
Various considerations, including especially the weight of
the intended tax burdens involved in changes in social se-
curity taxes and in excises and other indirect taxes, will deter-
mine whether the surtax burden actually imposed by new
legislation will be heavier (as in A) or lighter (as in B). Other
considerations will determine whether the total burden will
be distributed along the income scale according to a curve
(such as A) which changes direction very slowly, or according262 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
to a curve (such as C) which shifts burdens from small to
large incomes. These choices will be made in the legislative
process by a rough balancing of considerations, some of
which are conflicting. We do not attempt to predict the
choices at which this process will arrive. Nor do we make
any careful estimate, based upon the elaborate application
of suggested advances in rates to probable incomes in the
calendar year 1942, of the revenue yield of various alterna-
tives. We believe, however, that a inoderately steep advance
in present rates (such as implied roughly by Curve B) might
increase revenue $i billion, and that a steeper advance (such
as roughly implied by A) might increase revenue $2 billion.
Departure from Curve A, in the direction of Curve C, could
be designed to maintain the same increase in revenue, and
corresponding departure from Curve B could be worked out
in the same manner.9 The above indications of possible in-
creases in revenue pertain only to what can be accomplished
by rate advances, with other features of the 1941 Act un-
changed.
3 CHANGES IN THE BASE OF THE TAX
The argument for absorbing money incomes through higher
tax rates on personal incomes points also to a consideration
of changes, directed to the same end, in the base on which
the tax is levied. The personal exemption and credit for
dependents, the distinction between earned and other in-
come, the unit of reporting, the deductions permitted, and
the possibility of including income not now taxable, should
all be examined. In this exploration the question of equity
will have to be considered because it is implicit in each of
these issues. Fortunately, however, it is present, not in the
broad and highly controversial sense of the justice of the
existing distribution of wealth and income, but in the narrow
and more manageable sense of giving equal treatment to
persons whose circumstances are similar.TAXES ON INDIVIDUAL INCOMES 263
Personal Exemption and Credit for Dependents
The personal allowance under the Act of 1941 consists of
exemptions of $1,500 for married couples or heads of families
and $750 for single persons, and a credit of $400 for each
dependent. The logical basis for a personal allowance is that
some income is needed to purchase the absolute necessaries
of life, and should be free from t;x; and the argument is
especially strong in wartime because of the urgency to main-
tain public health and morale. Differences in the personal
responsibilities of taxpayers to provide the minimum of neces-
sary consumption for their dependents are also recognized.
No matter how drastically consumption is to be reduced and
how much income will correspondingly have to be trans-
ferred to the Treasury, these differences will always support
the case for differences in the personal allowance. The rele-
vant issue is not the existence of these allowances, or differ-
ences according to family status, but their amounts and dis-
tribution among taxpayers.
Under the 1941 Act the personal allowance for families
with two children, approximately the average number, means
the exemption of the first $2,300 of income. With a national
income of $92 billion ($88.9 billion paid out) families having
incomes of $2,300 or less may be expected to receive in
the aggregate about $27.5 billion. Single persons with in-
comes of $750 or below would receive about $1.5 billion.
Therefore, if we consider only the group with incomes so
low that, after the allowances, they are not subject to tax,
$29 billion of individual incomes totaling $8g billion would
be exempt. This figure does not include, moreover, the very
large aggregate allowance for the groups which do pay taxes.
On questions of this kind exact answers are not possible.
But in the present crisis, the wisdom of exempting, because
of the personal allowance, a fraction running well above one-
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questioned. If those responsible for public policy decided to
reduce the personal exemptions to $1,200 for married couples
and $6oo for single persons, with a credit of $300 for each
dependent, the amount exempt be reduced about $8
or $g billion. The lower of these two, if added to the income
subject to taxation and taxed at, say, 30 per cent (normal
plus surtax), would yield about $2.2 billion.10 The bulk of
this additional revenue would come from persons in the
higher brackets, through the reduction of their allowances.
Such reduced allowances as those illustrated above could less
easily be justified if a heavy general excise, or sales tax, were
adopted (see Ch. 9).
The benefit of the deduction of the personal exemption
and credit for dependents might be limited to the first bracket
of income subject to taxation, bearing the normal tax and
the lowest surtax. This allowance may now be deducted for
purposes of both the normal tax and any surtax. Hence it is
worth more to a rich person than to one of small or moderate
means, as may be seen by a simple example. The present
scale of rates at which income is taxed ranges approximately
from io to 8i per cent. The exemption under the Act of
1941 is worth io per cent of$2,300, or $230, to a married
man with two children in the lowest bracket of taxable in-
come, because it saves him from paying that much more in
taxes." To a person in similar domestic circumstances whose
income is so large that at least $2,300 of it is taxed in the
top bracket, the exemption is worth 8i per cent of $2,300,
or $1,863, because the exemption saves him from paying
that much more in taxes.
The personal exemption and credit for dependents could
be given the same value for every taxpayer by permitting
the deduction from his total tax of the amount of the nor-
mal tax and first surtax which this personal allowance saves
paying, instead of deducting the allowance itself from his
income. In short, under the 1941 Act a single man would
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plus $40 for each child. But a tax credit of $150 iS 10 per
cent of a personal exemption of $1,500. Hence, if the rate
of the combined normal tax and surtax were raised, the
credit would need be changed in order to be equivalent to
an exemption of $1,500.12 An additional revenue of about
$200 million might be yielded by this limitation on the per-
sonal allowances, at their figures under the 1941 Act. The
additional revenue yielded after the personal allowances had
been reduced to some such magnitudes as noted above would
be somewhat less.
Credit for 'Earned Income'
A distinction is made in the 1941 Act and several previous
acts between earnings from personal exertion and income
from property whereby earnings, somewhat artificially de-
fined and limited, are given a credit of io per cent against
the normal tax. All net incomes of $3,000 or less are, how-
ever, for purposes of this credit, assumed to be earned, irre-
spective of origin. Incomes in excess of $3,000 are entitled
to the credit only as they accrue from personal exertion, but
the credit is limited to $1,400. Hence, in the sense of the tax
law, no one may 'earn' more than $14,000. Additional income
is denied the benefit of the exemption, whether realized
from personal effort or from property.
The basis for this different treatment of incomes according
to source springs from an economic difference between in-
come from personal exertion and from property. Earnings
are subject to the contingencies of accident and sickness, and
to inevitable cessation to the enfeeblement of age
and death. Property income, on the other hand, may con-
tinue after the owner retires, and perhaps long after his
death, to endow his children and grandchildren. Some logi-
cal warrant exists for a distinction in taxation. But the case
is less clear in wartime when the risks which imperil the
permanence and certainty of property income may well in-
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income. A program of war taxation might accordingly in-
clude at least a temporary abandonment of the earned in-
come credit, especially as its elimination would remove one
perplexity of the taxpayer in calculating his tax and would
reduce the administrative task of the Treasury. With income
tax burdens as now visualized, perhaps reaching to a mini-
mum rate of 30 per cent, the relief granted by the credit is
in truth relatively small, because the credit stands merely
against the normal tax.13 We do not find any conclusive
argument for abandoning or for maintaining the credit and
believe the decision may well hinge upon whether, in view
of the impelling need for raising new taxes, it may be con-
tinued without imposing some alternative burdens upon its
beneficiaries. The revenue involved would run to about
$200 million.
Capital Gains and Losses
Another respect in which the present law treats one source
of 'income' differently from another is in the special pro-
visions concerning capital gains. Whether such gains are in
fact income and should be subject to tax has long been
controversial. At a time like the present, when a primary
objective of additional taxatIon is to absorb spending power
which might otherwise be used in bidding up prices, the case
for taxing such gains has peculiar force, because little doubt
exists that numerous individuals are in fact stimulated by
capital gains to spend more, especially on consumer goods.
In any case, we accept the fact that public policy regards and
has for many years regarded capital gains as income subject
to taxation.
One provision of the 1941 Act with respect to capital gains
is that the portion of any gain regarded as income for tax
purposes depends on the interval between purchase and sale.
This portion is ioo per cent for short term gains (those real-
ized when the interval is not over i8 months), and is scaled
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until the portion reaches a minimum of 50 per cent. There-
fore, except for short term gains, a capital gain does not bear
the full weight of the income tax. The essential purpose of
this scaling down isto make a rough allowance for the
assumption that the total gain accrued over the entire inter-
val following purchase. Otherwise a taxpayer who held an
asset for five years, then realized a large capital gain, might
be taxed (on his capital gain) more heavily than if he real-
ized each year the part of the gain which accrued that year
and was taxed on it. The decisive point is that realizing the
single large gain in one year might so augment his total
income that, some of the gain would be taxed at a much
higher bracket rate than if the same gain had been realized
in installments during the intermediate years. The scaling
down of the portion taxable dbes not precisely correct this
disparity but tends to do so.
Whether this ameliorating feature of the law should be
retained (or retained in part) during the war requires con-
sideration. During 1941 and the first quarter of 1942 prices
did not in general advance in capital markets; but unless
policies directed toward the prevention of inflation are effec-
tive, an advance is not unlikely. And, even while the general
market is sluggish, the prices of particular securities or other
capital assets may advance sharply because of special cir-
cumstances affecting their market value. Whether such price
advances during wartime are general or for particular assets
alone, capital gains will accrue and may be realized. But for
any such gain realized in wartime, the presumption may be
far from strong that the gain accrued over the entire interval
during which the asset was held. On the contrary, with re-
spect to an asset held five years, very strong presumption
may exist that all or nearly all of the gain accrued in the
last 'year or two, and was due entirely to conditions peculiar
to the war. In these circumstances, the case for scaling down
the gain, before entering it as an item of income subject to
tax, may be much less strong than under ordinary conditions.268 FISCAL PLANNING FOR. TOTAL WAR
The issue is not likely to be serious unless prices advance
sharply in security and other capital markets, but in such
an event the government may again question the wisdom of
scaling down long term capital gains by the .percentages pro-
vided under the 1941 Act. Reducing the relief from taxes
granted through these scaled percentages might also discour-
age dangerous advances in capital markets. The analysis on
this aspect of the case is intricate and uncertain, especially
as the treatment of capital losses is also involved. Indeed,
question may well be raised whether the tax on capital gains
should be made more severe without granting corresponding
concessions on capital losses; and, if this were done, a decline
in market prices might lead to substantial reduction in rev-
enue on account of capital loss offsets against income.
Joint Returns
The House Committee on Ways and Means, impressed by
inequities arising under the option given husband and wife
of filing separate returns, strongly recommended in 1941
compulsory joint returns, a measure which, if made law,
would have brought an additional revenue then estimated
at $287 million.14 When released for public inspection this
proposal was viewed in various lights. Some saw it as an attack
on women's rights. Others, especially persons from the com-
munity property states whose citizens have an advantage
under the present procedure, were concerned about states'
rights. And many, including some church leaders, held that
marriage among rich persons might not be found preferable
to other relationships if it cost more in taxes. Hence, the pro-
posal never received the serious consideration of the country
on the central issue the Committee sought to raise, namely,
whether the family or the individual is the more appropriate
unit for income taxation.
The Senate Committee on Finance, aware of the reception
given the recommendation of the corresponding committee
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broad language was designed to conform to the constitutional
requirements of geographical uniformity in taxation, and
yet, in practice, to apply with special force in the community
property states. The tax on earned income was to be assessed
against the person who earned it. The tax on community
property income was to be assessed against the person manag-
ing the assets. Accordingly, in community property states
the husband, because he usually manages the property, would
be taxed on nearly all income, and the advantage in taxation
given marital partnerships would be removed. This measure
did not propose a compulsory joint return, and consequently
did not arouse the popular opposition the Ways and Means
proposal did. Nevertheless, it suffered the fate of the other
recommendation, defeat by the parent body.
The compulsory joint return is a question of taxation, not
of states' rights or of morals. Either the individual, or the
family as represented by husband and wife, may be regarded
as the unit of taxation. Appropriate rates can absorb the
same aggregate purchasing power wh.ether the one or the
other is taxed. The issue basically is that of treating persons
in similar circumstances alike. On this question the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means argued that the compulsory joint
return:
i)"preventsthe income tax law from operating unfairly with
respect to a family where all the income is received by one
spouse as compared with a family where the income is re-
ceived by both;
2) removes the discrimination under the present law against
earned income in favor of investment income; and
3)treats a family living in one part of the United States in the
same manner as a family living in another part of the United
States, thus removing the discrimination at present existing in
favor of those residing in community property states."
Various arguments are offered against the solution favored
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tax in order to endow their wives, ought not to be denied the
privilege of filing separate returns. The right to file a separate
return is a link in a long chain of hard won rights of women
to property, the removal of which might weaken the chain
as a whole. And from the community property states comes
the plea, made with force by Senator Connally, that "to treat
the rights of the wife under the constitutions and statutes of
eight great states as non-existent flies in the very face of the
heretofore well-recognized principle that the states control
the ownership of property and income".15
The first of these arguments assumes an implied contrac-
tual obligation which does not exist. The payer of a gift
tax buys no right to a continuance of the status quo in the
taxation of personal income. Moreover, that the gift tax
serves primarily as a less expensive substitute for the estate
tax is usually ignored by those who advance this first argu-
ment. The second argument ignores the fact that under the
proposal of the Committee on Ways and Means, the married
man and the married woman are treated alike. Moreover,
either spouse might elect to have the liability in the return
apportioned according to individual obligation. The Com-
mittee sought merely to shift the basis of reporting from
the individual to the family unit, as measured by the com-
bined income of husband and wife.
The third argument reasons from the right of the states
to define ownership of income to the right of the federal
government to tax. Its basis is the established legal principle
that ownership of income or property according to state law
entails federal recognition of such title. On substantive
grounds, the federal government may wish to lay a tax which
runs counter to the interests of certain income receivers
or property owners in community property states. Whether
the above-mentioned principle is a bar to compulsory joint
returns is for judicial determination.
The Ways and Means Committee proposal has also been
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income from community income. For, under its plan, the
income of the woman, independent of her marriage, would
be incorporated with that of her husband for taxation at
higher rates. Accordingly, a provision has been favored stat-
ing that "the amount reported on each return shall be deter-
mined without increase, diminution or division because of
any right, title, or interest created by or dependent on the
marriage relation".lG But, if such a remedy should prove
impossible of enactment, it has been suggested that all in-
comes be taxed as in community property states.
Both solutions would remove the special advantage of
married persons in community property states. They differ,
however, in their dispensation of benefits. Under the first,
married couples with two incomes would be favored, as at
present, over married couples with a single income. Under
the second, married couples with community income would
be favored both over married couples with income outside
the community and over single individuals.17 Neither makes
the family income the unit of taxation as measured by the
combined income of husband and wife. That view of the
taxable unit is strongly indicated when taxation is designed
to reduce consumption, for in general the family is the
consuming unit. It may be more fundamental than elimina-
tion of the difference between the treatment of taxpayers
in community and noncommunity property states, or any in-
cidental distinction that may be made between the taxation
of married and of single persons.
No one rule can apply with equal fairness to all. Un-
doubtedly choice of the family unit of taxation would mean
higher taxes on many married couples than each would pay
if taxed separately. In 1938, of 3,041,624 married couples
who reported income only 175,598 filed separate returns.18
The number would be higher under more recent laws, with
their steeper rate graduation. But the possible inequities
arising from uniform treatment of these couples seem less
important than the inequities inevitable under the individual272 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
unit of taxation. Why should a family to which both husband
and wife contribute income pay less in taxes than a family
to which only one member contributes? Most individual
incomes are ultimately family incomes. The joint return
simply recognizes that fact for purposes of taxation. From
the viewpoint of war incentives, however, the joint return
may be viewed as possibly discouraging the wife from going
into productive work: her income would be subject to a
rate at least as high as the highest bracket rate on her hus-
band's income. For this reason, an additional 'earned in-
come' credit may be advisable for cases in which both spouses
report 'earned' income.
Deductions for Miscellaneous Taxes Paid
Federal taxes on various commodities and services, for ex-
ample, admissions, club dues, telegraph and telephone mes-
sages, and theatre tickets, may be deducted if they are im-
posed, by the form of the law, on the person filing the return.
State taxes on commodities and services, including retail sales,
gasoline, tobacco, electricity, gas, and the like, are deductible
under similar conditions. State income and automobile li-
cense taxes, and state and local taxes on real estate, except
special assessments, offer opportunity for other tax-saving
deductions.
These deductions have diverse and not altogether con-
sistent bases. The test for the deduction of a tax on a com-
modity or service is payment by the person filing the return,
and the fact of payment is established by the form of the law
levying the tax. Thus this deduction is based on the theory
that the incidence of a tax may be determined by law. On
the surface, this is not to be denied: the law can prescribe
the person from whom the tax is to be collected, even though
some other person (e.g., a seller of gasoline) acts as the state's
collection agent. But to reason from the passage of the tax
money to its payment, or from no formal exchange of this
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or final payment of a tax may be determined by law. Accept-
ance of this theory under the federal income tax law now
causes such anomalies as the deductibility of gasoline taxes
paid in some states and denial of the deduction in others,
and the deductibility of some state tobacco taxes while other
state taxes and the federal tax on this commodity may not
be deducted. Moreover, the theory itself is false. Determina-
tion of the final and therefore sole true payment of a tax
is the function of economic analysis, not of the statutory form.
But once that function is performed and the burden of a
tax on a commodity or service is located, the tax should not
necessarily be deducted from the income of the person mak-
ing the final payment. He may have been recompensed
through the benefit of some public enterprise financed by
the tax. When no special benefit is received, he may still have
paid through the tax a share of governmental costs properly
chargeable to him. Or, as in the instance of a tobacco or
liquor tax, the state may intend that purchases of this sort
shall be especially burdened. No one of these situations
offers clear support for favoring within the same income classi-
fication the purchaser of taxed articles over the purchaser of
untaxed articles, or for distinguishing his situation respecting
the deduction from that of purchasers with incomes exempt
from the income tax and therefore not relieved by the de-
duction.1°
Another deduction, long permitted under the revenue acts,
is interest paid, regardless of the purpose of the indebtedness:
interest on loans to purchase houses or for consumption or
other personal purposes stands on the same footing as interest
incurred as a cost of producing income. If, in determining
whether interest is deductible for calculating taxable income,
the government wishes to distinguish between business and
nonbusiness loans, precedent can be found in various pro-
visions ofstatutes where the test has been whether the ex-
penditure was incurred in the expectation of profit. Denying
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lead, in the aggregate, to a very substantial increase in the
total net income subject to tax.
Deductions for nonbusiness interest payments and for taxes
on commodities and services, and the automobile license,
could be eliminated simply by their denial, yielding a revenue
of perhaps $200 million.20
4 TAX AVOIDANCE
Action to augment the yield of the personal income tax, in-
cluding especially advances in rates, would make avoidance
even more tempting. The higher the tax payment on a given
income, the greater the reward for avoidance; the temptation
is sharpened by graduated rates, because any decrease in in-
come subject to taxation reduces the amount to which the
highest rates apply and becomes especially effective in reduc-
ing the tax payment. Hence it becomes necessary at this
point to consider measures which might be taken to prevent
or reduce avoidance of the personal income tax.
Tax Exempt Securities
Many methods formerly available for avoiding payment of
income taxes have been invalidated by successive changes in
the law. The principal method still available is the purchase
of tax-exempt securities, which changes the tax status of
income. State and local bonds and some federal issues are
wholly tax exempt. The purchaser who converts a portion of
his income-yielding assets into these securities reduces the
amount of income subject to tax and his taxes. If he invests
all his assets in tax-exempts, he will pay no tax whatever on
property income.
On June 30, 1941, approximately $20 billion of state and
local government securities, interest from which is wholly
exempt from both normal tax and surtaxes, were outstand-
ing.2' About $4.8 billion were held by federal, state, and
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mainder was in private hands. Of the federal debt outstand-
ing in the hands of the public, only $4.8 billion, consisting
mainly of low interest short term notes, were exempt from
surtaxes; though to this amount should be added about $i.i
billion of wholly tax exempt Federal Land Bank and Joint
Stock Land Bank bonds. The public also held some $80
billion of partly exempt federal securities, which are less
effective as instruments of tax avoidance because they are
exempt from the normal tax alone.
The federal government has provided by law for the taxa-
tion of all future issues of its securities. State and local obliga-
tions, however, may still be issued on a tax-free basis. More-
over, even if future issues were made taxable, the huge
amount already outstanding, much of which is still held by
individuals and institutions subject to relatively low rates of
tax as compared with the rates applicable to the higher levels
of individual incomes, would constitute a reservoir of tax-
exempt issues, purchasable in the open market, for investors
seeking to avoid federal income taxes. Even under 1941 rates,
Secretary Morgenthau has estimated that $200 million of
additional revenue would be received if the tax immunity
of state and local government securities were removed.22
Transfers of existing tax exempt securities from individuals
subject to relatively low rates to those subject to higher rates
could greatly augment the present revenue k 1s of the federal
government arising from the existence o'such securities.
The recent and expected further advances in income tax
rates, moreover, provide a strong incentive for just such trans-
fers. For example, to an individual with a $5,000 net income
from other sources, a 4 per cent municipal bond offers the
same net yield after allowing for taxes as a taxable security
returning 4.60 per cent; but to an individual with a $ioo,ooo
net income from other sources, it offers as large a net yield
as a 12.50 per cent return from a taxable security. Under
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the House Ways and Means Committee on March 1942,
a man with a net income of $ioo,ooo from other sources
would obtain a larger net yield after taxes from a 4 per Cent
municipal bond than from aper cent return on a taxable
investment.23 The wartime need for revenue and his desire
to prevent holders of tax exempt securities from avoiding
wartime advances in tax rates, as well as other considerations,
led Secretary Morgenthau to propose, in his March 3 state-
ment, the immediate taxation of all income from present
and future issues of tax-exempt securities. But a constitu-
tional question exists respecting the right of the federal
government to tax income from the securities of state and
local governments. The Treasury Department has announced
its intention of bringing the issue before the Supreme Court
as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, Congressional action has
been proposed as a speedier solution, and one more likely of
favorable action, than a Constitutional amendment.
The treatment of tax-exempt securities is complicated by
considerations of equity and good faith with respect to in-
vestors, many of whom were moved to buy the securities
because the latter were believed to be tax free. To withdraw
the privilege of tax exemption, or to withdraw it without
compensation, would be regarded by some as a breach of
faith, although, technically, the federal government has never
made a commitment to maintain the tax immunity of state
and local obligations. (Secretary Morgenthau has not pro-
posed to withdraw the immunity from outstanding federal
obligations possessing it.) The solution is also complicated
by the reluctance of state and local governments to face
the prospect of higher interest costs on future obligations,
by reason of the withdrawal of tax immunity, although all
levels of government taken as a whole would gain more in
revenue than they would lose in additional interest costs.
Granted constitutional freedom of action, Congress is con-
fronted with the task of resolving these conflicting considera-
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Undistributed Corporate Profits
A corporate device important until recent years as a means
of avoiding personal income taxes was the personal holding
company. A wealthy man may organize a personal holding
company to receive income from his investments. Since the
company created by him is subject to his control, he may in
its name and through its facilities purchase and sell securi-
ties, borrow money, manage properties, and carry on other
financial transactions. Indeed, such a corporation may serve
many purposes besides tax avoidance. In its custody, income
is taxed at rates applicable to such an organization, whereas,
in the possession of the owner, it would be subject to the
personal income tax. By limiting his personal receipt of in-
come from the company to living expenses, a wealthy person
could formerly profit from the difference between the cor-
porate income tax and the rate at which income in his per-
sonal possession would be taxed. The temptation to use so
adaptable an instrument was formerly correspondingly great.
The advantages of the personal holding company as a means
of avoiding taxes have been countered by the imposition of
a special tax on personal holding companies at the extraordi-
narily high rates of 71 '/2 per cent of all undistributed income
up to $2,000 and 821/2 per cent of all undistributed income in
excess of that amount. Therefore only the richest persons
can now realize any tax advantage from the organization
of a personal holding company. Moreover, the legal definition
of a personal holding company offers little hope to the person
who would seek to form an incorporated enterprise to accom-
plish the purposes of a personal holding corporation with-
out becoming liable to the special holding company tax.
Consequently, this method of tax avoidance seems to be
effectively blocked.
The business corporation may, however, be used indirectly
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come tax. Sometimes this effect is sought and brought about
by design. A group of wealthy directors, owning stock in a
closely held corporation may vote to retain earnings not so
much because of the needs of the business as on account of
the large surtaxes for which they would be personally liable
were these earnings disbursed.25 Again, the earnings may be
needed by the enterprise, and retention may te decided solely
with respect to that need. Even so, the effect of the decision,
regardless of the underlying motive, is to avoid payment
of such personal income tax as would fall upon dividends
if distributed.
Corporations accumulating a surplus', that is,
retaining earnings in excess of reasonable business needs, are
subject to a special tax of 27½ per cent on the first $ioo,ooo,
and 381/2 per cent on any additional amount. Prevention of
intentional avoidance alone is sought; if a good reason exists
for retaining profits in the business, this may be done without
penalty. Even so, in the present situation, this tax may prove
to be a powerful weapon against tax avoidance. Under the
system of allocating resources according to a priority schedule,
companies making military or essential civilian supplies alone
are permitted to expand. Consequently the use of retained
earnings is limited to situations in which plant expansion
is held to be in the national interest. Other companies,ebeing
unable to enlarge their facilities or even their inventories,
will find difficulty in justifying the accumulation of a large
surplus in the form of cash or securities. With the burden
of justification on them, they will probably pay out a large
part of their earnings. The retained earnings of corpora-
tions engaged in war work will enable their stockholders to
avoid paying as much in personal income taxes as they would
if all earnings, were distributed; but the wartime rates of
corporate income and excess profits will probably
reduce this possibility of avoidance to relatively small pro-
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5 TAXATION OF ESTATES AND GIFTS
Because of certain theoretical and practical relations between
taxation of individual incomes and taxation of estates and
gifts, the latter is discussed briefly in this chapter. In compari-
son with corporation and individual taxes and excises, levies
on estates and gifts are secondary sources of revenue. Under
the schedule of higher rates adopted in 1941theymay be
expected to yield about $530millionin the fiscal year 1943,
chieflyfrom the levy on estates, to which the gift tax is a mere
corollary designed to accelerate the distribution of property
and to assist in preventing avoidance and evasion.2G
Since the death duties have a long tradition of service in
emergency fiscal programs, it is not surprising to find that
they are now being urged as a source of additional revenue.
Strong objections exist to the use of either the gift or estate
tax purely as a source of emergency revenue. Both are applied
at irregular and frequently widely spaced intervals. Although
both have narrow scope, they do place severe burdens upon
some of the transfers to which .they apply. Funds to pay the
estate tax are not always easy to find, and the tax may bring
severe hardship in a substantial minority of cases, especially
when the estate consists entirely or largely of property for
which no ready market exists.
Sudden or frequent rate changes would cause discrimina-
tory treatment among individuals making transfers of like
size. The heirs of someone dying in a period when the federal
government needs revenue badly may well ask why they
should pay exceptionally high taxes, while the heirs of an-
other are taxed more lightly because he dies in a period of
relative fiscal ease. In the case of both these transfer taxes,
and especially because of the involuntary basis for the transfer
in the case of the levy on estates, excellent prima facie argu-
ment exists for maintaining a rate schedule, a set of exemp..
tions, and a tax law which will not be subject to drastic
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This argument is reinforced by the fact that these taxes
are poor instruments for implementing short-run fiscal poli-
cies intended to alter the volume and direction of the money
flows in a capitalist society. They are very slow in producing
results of the sort needed io control inflation, particularly
the levy on estates, which is not due until fifteen months
after the date of death and whose payment can be postponed
as much as ten years more if the taxpayer can show that
unusual hardship attends earlier payment.27 Consequently
the estate tax would be a most unsatisfactory method of re-
ducing consumer income, the chief current role assigned to a
system of war finance. In less degree the same thing is true
of the tax on gifts.28
Despite these considerations, revision of these taxes de-
serves examination. Devices intended to produce in the pres-
ent some of the revenues that will accrue in the future are
well worth examining; moreover, a permanent revision of
these taxes may be in order. For example, higher estate taxes
persisting after the war will aid in meeting the postwar reve-
nue needs, in which a heavy interest charge on the enlarged
public debt will be a major element. Hence a strong argu-
ment can be made in favor of carrying through now any
upward revision that is deliberately a matter of long-run
policy, not merely a temporary device for the duration.
One plan for speeding up collections the estate tax
was offered at the Congressional hearings on the revenue bill
of 1941. As presented, it provided that individuals could
deposit funds in earmarked accounts at the Treasury for the
purpose of meeting the tax liabilities against their estates
at death. No interest was to be paid, but the accounts were to
be redeemable at their face value when the estate tax came
due and provision was made for refunds in the event the ear-
marked account exceeded the tax. The inducement was the
exclusion of the account from the net estate upon which the
tax would be imposed. While a device of this type is almost
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mentbonds, in which the funds so earmarked would presum-
ably be invested, the extent to which that demand would
arise out of current savings instead of from previous accumu-
lations is not likely to be great, and some of the funds would
doubtless be obtained from a smaller investment in insurance.
The result would be at the very least a partial offsetting of
one demand for government bonds by another.
However, even if the efficacy of this device as a means of
bringing in money promptly can be assumed, strong objec-
tions can be raised against it. Not only is the bait that is
supposed to produce immediate revenues a tax concession
running to about $ioo million,29 but these accounts would
clearly be relatively more attractive to larger estates, for
they withdraw assets from the top bracket to which the tax
is being applied. Hence the benefit realized will tend to be
strongly regressive in its effects, which is a forceful argument.
against the prepayment scheme in this particular form.
However, an alternative has the sanction of a precedent
set during World War I: granting permission to pay estate
taxes with government bonds. Since the inducement is not
the withdrawal of assets from the taxable estate, the obviously
regressive effects of the first scheme are avoided. The induce-
ment takes the form of a guarantee against loss resulting
from a decline in the market price of the government security
between the date of purchase and the date the tax is due. This
would require the issuance of registered coupon bonds which
would be receivable at par or at the purchase price, which-
ever is higher.3°
Of course this prepayment scheme involves a risk of loss
on the part of the government, but to the extent that it works,
it will tend to maintain the market for government bonds
and hence to lessen the risk of loss itself. Although it may
well be argued that the results are uncertain and especially
that the amount of government bonds which would be pur-
chased from current savings on this account is highly ques-
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A second and more important issue to be discussed here
is the desirability of a permanent reconstruction of the estate
and gift taxes now. This is not the place for a thoroughgoing
review of the loopholes that might be plugged in the interest
of greater yield. Fortunately most of those remaining are
minor and attention can be concentrated upon a few ques-
tions at the heart of current debate, namely, the concessions
made to insurance, the issues involved in laws of the com-
munity property states, the relation between gift and estate
taxes, and the rates imposed and the exemptions allowed
under the latter.
In part the insurance problem is a matter of bringing
within the scope of the tax policies which are taken out on
the life of the decedent but are not payable to his estate, and
in which he has retained none of the property rights the
courts label the incidents of ownership. Until recently such
polices were not taxable under the estate tax and hence con-
stituted an attractive avenue of avoidance. Recently the
government has been attempting to tax them in whole or in
part on the basis of the payment of premiums by the insured
decedent, but as this tactic has vainly been tried before in
the courts it is not a certain remedy. One alternative within
the power of Congress is a special levy on the transfer of
insurance. However, it is doubtful that such a tax could
be made to vary with either the size of the insured's estate
or the total amount the beneficiary receives upon the death
of the insured. If this cannot be done, the remedy will be
only partial and the loophole will have been only partly
closed.
Even if the proceeds of an insurance policy can be brought
within the decedent's gross estate, the law excludes the first
$40,000 worth of insurance from the net estate upon which
the tax is applied. This concession is purely a matter of policy
and can be withdrawn at the will of Congress. The argu-
ments raised in its favor boil down to the thesis that no
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ceived do little more than compensate for the loss of the de-
cedent's earning power, and a similar argument to the effect
that insurance is merely an accumulation intended to provide
for a future need. The same arguments can be advanced for
other forms of savings, and do not establish a case for the
special treatment of this particular form. The same conclu-
sion may be drawn respecting the repeated suggestion that an
accumulation of insurance be permitted outside the gross
estate in order to provide a fund from which the estate taxes
can be paid. The one really satisfactory justification for the
present exclusion would be the establishment of the idea
that insurance is •an especially desirable method of saving
from a social point of view. Against this view may be cited
the development of governmental insurance schemes as well
as the limited scope and peculiar distribution of the holdings
of private insurance. A strong case exists for withdrawing
the concession, unless Congress wishes to grant a subsidy to
savings in the form of insurance.
The systems of property law used in the community prop-
erty jurisdictions are a source of another major defect in
the estate tax. Half of the current accumulations of a husband
and wife that do not arise from what is known technically
under such laws as their separate property is regarded as
vested in each. Hence only half of these assets is subject to
death duties on the death of either, a fact which, taken in
combination with a substantial exemption and sharply pro-
gressive rates, discriminates in favor of estates passing under
this system of law, and implies some reduction in the yield
of the federal tax. One solution proposed is a federal tax on
the power of management, all of which, under the law in
community property states, is normally in the hands of the
husband and passes from him upon his death.
Third among the major problems is the relation between
the schedule of rates in gift and estate taxes. Each is highly
progressive, each is computed independently, and the gift tax
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centive to distribute assets by gifts among the living. If the
social results and the reduction in tax avoidance achieved
by this preferential treatment are believed inadequate to
compensate for the loss of revenue, the tactic indicated
is the addition of the gifts the decedent has made dur.
ing his life to his net estate upon his death, and the computa-
tion of a tax due on the basis of this total, against which tax
the gift taxes which had previously been paid with respect
to the assets in question will be allowed as a credit. Opinion
is by no means unanimous, however, that the preferential
treatment of gifts is not justified by the results.
A final question concerns the appropriate rate schedule
and the exemptions of the estate tax, even if the integration
just discussed is not attempted. The estate tax is characterized
by a relatively large exemption, relatively low rates on small
estates and even those of considerable size, and punitive rates
on large fortunes. The present rates, particularly on the lower
brackets, are notably less severe than those prevailing in
Great Britain. There is a clear possibility of raising considera-
ble additional revenue by lowering the exemptions and by
a drastic increase in the rates applied to all except the very
largest estates.
Although such action may be found expedient and desira-
ble, it must be taken cautiously and with due consideration
of the effect upon the states. The latter also have made use
of these taxes for a considerable period, and a few rely upon
death duties for a substantial portion of their total tax reve-
nue in an average year. For this reason, not all the additional
yield of a more aggressive federal tax should be counted
upon to increase federal revenues. The estate and gift taxes
could be made to contribute more to federal revenues in the
immediate as well as the more remote future; how much de-
pends upon the action taken: by drastic advances in rates,
especially on smaller and medium size estates, and by lower-
ing exemptions, the yield could perhaps be doubled, adding
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NOTES
1 Taxable income may be defined with approximate accuracy as net income
realized in money from all sources other than tax-exempt securities, or in
things of monetary value arising in the conduct of business operations. Thus
wages, salaries, commissions, profits on unincorporated businesses, royalties,
net rents, dividends, interest, and gains (subject to special provisions) from
the sale of property are taxable income; as are compensation in property or
in board and lodging, and gains arising from the exchange of property or
(with some reservations) from changes in the value of an inventory.
2 Act of 1941 contains an innovation: taxpayers computing payments
on incomes of not more than $3ooo derived wholly from wages, salaries,
compensation for personal services, dividends, interest, annuities, or royalties
may file on Form io4oA. In developing this form, allowance was made for
average deductions, as compiled from previous tax returns, taken by persons
of this income group. The taxpayer has only to subtract the personal ex-
emption and credit for dependents, if any, from his income, and find by in-
spection the tax on the remainder.
3 Strictly, such addition is not wholly valid, because the basis of calculation
is not exactly the same for the normal tax as for the surtax.
Wesay here 'a given percentage increase in surtax net income', because
the horizontal scale of the chart is on a ratio basis: equal distances along the
scale represent equal percentage increases, not equal amounts of increase in
income.
5 The average rate of surtax discussed above, computed as a ratio of the
total surtax to surtax net income, should not be confused with the effective
rate sometimes useful in measuring the full weight of a tax burden. The
essential difference is that the effective rate is obtained by dividing the total
surtax (or, if the entire income tax and not only the surtax is considered,
the total tax) by total net taxable income before personal exemption and
credits for dependents have been deducted, rather than by surtax net income,
which is after such deductions. Hence, the effective rate of tax is always
(provided personal exemption and credits for dependents are allowed against
net taxable income before computing the surtax, as under the present law)
less than the average rate used above.
Because the personal exemption and dependent credits vary among tax-
payers, no single curve of effective rates to all taxpayers could be
drawn. The best that could be done would be to Construct a curve of effective
rates for an 'average' taxpayer having the 'average' exemption and credits.
Such a curve would show somewhat lower rates than the average rates of
Chart 8, but the difference would become smaller as income increased and
would be scarcely discernible for large incomes.
C Thus, even a person who supposes that purely political considerations con-
trolled the rate advances of the 1940 Act would discover that, whereas it did
not raise surtax rates (it did, however, raise the total income tax io per cent,286 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
by the Defense Tax, applied at all levels) on incomes below $6,ooo, it might
have yielded as much revenue without advancing surtax rates on incomes up
to a level considerably above $6,ooo, if it had added still heavier burdens
above that level.
Toindicate roughly the significance of these descriptive levels of income,
we would suggest $1,750 as the upper boundary of the 'low' brackets and
$10,000 as the lower boundary of the 'high.' The 'lower intermediate' brackets
would run from $1,750 to about $5,000; and the 'upper intermediate' from
$5,000to$io,ooo. The 'lower high' brackets run from $10,000 to $20,000, and
at a later stage we shall speak of the 'middle high' as running roughly from
to $100,000.
8 would not be confiscatory if each authority recognized a tax levied
by the other as deductible from income before the calculation of its tax.
The entire increase in revenue from new surtaxes imposed on income for
the calendar year 1942 would not become available for the fiscal year 1943.
Under the 1941 Act, the increase in the fiscal year would be only about
one-half of the total increase, as only two of the quarterly installments of
taxes on 1942 incomes are paid before June 30, 1943. See, however, Chapter
ii, where the bearing of stoppage-at-the-source on the timing of revenue and
its applicability to surtaxes are discussed.
10 In this estimate effect is given to the earned income credit.
11 Since the effect of the personal exemption is alone being considered, the
earned income calculation is not made here.
12 Another way of limiting the effect of the personal allowance would be to
permit its deduction only from the first bracket of income subject to taxa-
tion; then the allowance would always bear the same relation to the com-
bined rate. Either method, with present rates and exemptions, would give
the same yield.
13 A married man with two children having an income of $3,000 would count
all the income earned and have a credit of $300. His personal allowance
would be $2,300 and his income subject to normal tax of 4 per cent would
be $400 after the earned income credit and $700 without it; the normal tax
is reduced from $28 to $16 by the credit. If the first surtax rate was 26 per
cent, his surtax would be $182. The $12 saved by his credit, while not
negligible, is a very small part of his entire tax, about 6 per cent.
14 Estimate of a Treasury representative, apparently for the fiscal year 1942,
in Revenue Act of 1941,Hearingsbefore the Senate Committee on Finance
(77th Cong., ist Sess. 1941), p. 8.
This view, said to be that of "the only community property state Senator
on the Finance Committee," was published as a supplement to the report of
the Committee.
16 G. T. Altman, Community Property and Joint Returns, Taxes, The Tax
Magazine, Oct. 1941.
17 If half the earnings of the husband were taxed to the wife, the aggregateTAXES ON INDIVIDUAL INCOMES 287
taxpaid by both would be less under the prevailing scale of graduated rates
than the tax paid by a single individual receiving an equal income.
18 Committee on Ways and Means, Report, Revenue Revision of 1941,p.i6.
19 The issue whether property taxes, most of which are imposed on real
estate, should be deducted, is more complicated and can be considered best
in connection with the treatment of rent. A person receiving rent must report
it together with any additional income, but may deduct taxes on the rented
property and other expenses incurred in obtaining this rent. The occupant
of a house who is also the owner is not required to report the annual value
of the occupancy, yet may deduct interest payments on the mortgage or
other indebtedness as well as taxes paid on the house. A desire to foster
home ownership possibly explains in part this form of subsidy; but as we
are solely concerned with the taxation aspects of this question, not with the
general issue of the subsidy, we merely note that home ownership could be
subsidized by other means.
The tenant suffers from a one-way discrimination as compared with the
landlord, and a two-way discrimination as compared with the owner-occu-
pant. In his rent, on the average, is included the amount of the landlord's
taxes on the house or apartment occupied. Yet these taxes, together with any
on the ground value of the property, may be deducted from the income, for
tax purposes, of the landlord. The tenant may not deduct the rent (in which
the hidden tax is included) from his income, yet the owner-occupant of real
property of equal annual value is not required to include that value in his
income and may even deduct the taxes on the property.
To remedy this inequitable situation, the privilege of deducting property
taxes on owner-occupied houses might be withdrawn, or the annual value of
the owner-occupant's house might be included in his income. But denial of
the deduction of taxes would do little to equalize the Situation of the tenant
with that of the owner-occupant. The tenant would not be able to deduct
his rent, and the owner-occupant would continue to enjoy an income from
occupancy on a tax-free basis. A treatment that meets both inequities would
require the annual value of any real estate occupied by the owner to be in-
cluded in his income. Inasmuch as the annual value would, in common with
the rent of leased dwellings, include part of the real estate tax, both the
inclusion of the annual value and the denial of the deduction of the property
tax would not be fair, because a portion of the property would be taxed
twice.
20 Estimated largely on the basis of deductions for automobile ownership and
operation. A much larger sum, possibly as much as $400 million at tax rates
under the Act of 1941, would be realized by the inclusion of the annual value
of the occupancy of owner.occupied homes. To gather such a revenue would
require the addition of a considerable administrative staff to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, for checking valuations would be difficult, especially in the
first years. Assuming, however, that occupancy values were determined with
fair accuracy, both the cause of equal treatment and of absorbing more pur-
chasing power would be served by the adoption of this measure. However,288 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
when heavy administrative burdens are being added to ihe Bureau by other
changes in the law, this further task will be advanced as an argument against
changing the treatment of income from owner-occupied houses; and the
political resistances to such a change may be decisive, even in the face of the
exceptional fiscal needs of wartime.
21 Secretary of the Treasury, Annual Report, 1941,pp.629 if.
22 Statement of March 3, 1942 before the House Ways and Means Committee.
23 After allowing a personal exemption of $1,500 ifl each case.
24Lawrence H. Seltzer's more detailed discussion in the report of the
Thirty-Fourth National Tax Conference held at St. Paul, Minnesota, Oct.
1941: Possibilities of Speeding the Elimination of Tax-Exempt Se-
curities.
25 This is less likely to happen in a corporation the stock of which is widely
held.
26 In the fiscal year 1941 the gift tax yielded $51,864,000; the levy on estates,
$555,194,000; the combined yield accounted for about 5 per cent of total
federal tax revenue.
27 The delay in collection arises because the tax is levied on the net estate
and the latter cannot be determined until the affairs of the decedent have
been looked into thoroughly. The extension of time beyond the ordinary
due date reflects a desire to avoid penalizing unnecessarily an estate made up
of assets that are not readily salable in order to get liquid funds to pay the
tax. Here immediate payment would cause a severe reduction in the net
estate beyond the amount this tax would take from an estate of similar size
which is in liquid form.
28 The gift tax is due on March 15 following the close of the calendar year
in which the gift was made and payment may be extended for an additional
six months.
29 The estimate of revenue loss under the rates applied in 1940 mentioned by
Representative Dewey.
80 As evidence of the purchase date the broker's certificate of purchase would
have to be presented when the tax is paid.
An alternative would be a special issue of bonds always receivable at par.